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The use of financial incentives in construction projects has been 
seen as a way to improve short term motivation, collaboration and reinforce 
long term commitment between project stakeholders. Yet, very little 
empirical research has been conducted into how financial incentives 
should be applied in the context of particular project types in order to 
maximise their effectiveness. The aim of this research paper is to identify 
the motivation drivers that influenced the effectiveness of financial 
incentives in an Australian Government large building project and to 
explain their characteristics in the project context. As part of a larger 
research project, this case study was undertaken to explore the 
perceptions of senior construction managers in response to a failed 
Financial Incentive Mechanism (FIM) in a relationship-based procurement 
environment. It was found that the strength of the financial reward on offer 
was not the major determinant of FIM effectiveness. Instead, a range of 
context dependent influences are identified and five key recommendations 
likely to improve the effectiveness of an FIM on similar projects are 
proposed.   
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INTRODUCTION  
FIMs built into a project contract aim to promote motivation and to 
reward contracting parties for achieving improved performance above 
‘business as usual’ (Washington, 1997). The types of FIMs applied in large 
building projects include: 
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• Profit sharing incentives.  Profit sharing incentives operate around 
a target construction sum (TCS), where cost savings from the 
actual construction sum (ACS) are distributed between the client 
and the contracted parties in pre-determined portions  
(Broome & Perry, 2002).  
• Performance incentives. Performance incentives are offered on the 
achievement of set performance targets that are related to specific 
project goals (Bower et al., 2002). This financial incentive type can 
be applied to a number of performance goals such as technical 
goals (e.g. safety, training, operation, non-disturbance, quality of 
work) and schedule goals (practical or actual competition prior to a 
target completion date).  
• Mixed incentives. Financial incentive mixes are characterised by 
the combination of profit sharing (cost outcome) and performance 
financial incentives. Multiple incentive mixes can include a multi-
objective system, where the total incentive amount awarded to 
participants is the sum of the partial incentives, and the partial loss 
of one of the incentives does not affect the opportunity of attaining 
the other bonus amounts (Lahdenpera and Koppinen, 2003).  
 
Generally, it has been identified from Australian construction industry 
reports that procurement approaches that include equitable incentive 
mechanisms applied across the entire project team are recommended to 
improve the performance within this industry (APCC, 1997; Sidwell et al., 
2002). Further, a major report by the Australian Procurement and 
Construction Council found that governments, as major clients, are in an 
ideal position to promote industry development by leading the way in their 
own procurement initiatives, including the use of ‘compatible incentive 
regimes’ (APCC, 1997). The report argued that government clients should 
be seen to be achieving the best ‘value from money’ from tax revenue for 
the social and economic benefit of Australian citizens. They should also 
provide a best practice model for the private sector to emulate. This paper 
aims to assist Government clients in the application of FIMs by outlining the 
motivation drivers that have influenced project performance in a large scale 
building project. The paper also fills a gap in the literature by providing a 
more detailed understanding of motivation under FIMs on construction 
projects, than has previously been available. The qualitative findings 
reported here provide a robust basis for the design of quantitative 
measures to be applied on multiple projects in future research.  
 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND THE PROJECT CONTEXT 
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There is currently a simplistic view within the construction literature 
that motivation is automatically assured if a financial incentive mechanism 
is present in a construction project (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000). It is argued 
in this paper that due to the complexity of the motivational environment, 
incentives can fail to promote the desired level of motivation if not 
strategically applied.  
Large-scale building projects are characterised by ‘one-off” 
designs that are constructed in a unique location with a wide variety of 
project stakeholders connected by a complex array of contractual 
relationships (APC, 1999; Cole, 2002). As each large-scale building project 
is unique, it is important to determine the influence of context on motivation 
drivers and FIM performance. The following case provides an example of 
failure and the negative motivation drivers that influenced its failure, 
shedding new light on the dynamics between the FIM design and the 
project environment. The case is an example of an Australian large-scale 
building project commissioned by a government client under a relationship-
based contract containing FIMs. 
THE CASE PROJECT  
A case study approach was selected as the most appropriate 
method to explore the complex subject of motivation on construction 
projects, given the absence of relevant, substantive pre-existing research 
in the literature. The data was collected through semi structured interviews 
with eight senior managers from four stakeholder groups, comprising client, 
managing contractor, consultant and subcontractor. Each interview was 
undertaken over a period of 90 minutes or more. The primary data 
comprising the interview transcripts were supported by secondary data 
such as project and contractual documentation, industry publications and 
site visits. The data was manually analysed and coded into motivation 
drivers according to the research conceptual framework. The data were 
collected between March and June, 2005. 
The project was an Australian government 14-story non-residential 
building with a construction cost of $130+ million. It was a landmark project 
with a complex and novel design. Despite contractor and consultant budget 
problems during the project, the project team successfully achieved the 
mandatory requirements in the contract, by meeting time and quality 
objectives. However, FIM goals beyond these mandatory requirements 
were not achieved.   
Procurement approach and FIM design 
The procurement approach on the project was a Managing 
Contractor – Design and Construction Management – Guaranteed 
Construction Sum (MC – D+CM (GCS)). Under this procurement approach, 
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the managing contractor was appointed by the government client at the 
end of schematic design stage, through a competitive tendering process. 
The contractor was appointed to manage the design documentation and 
construction of the project, based on a selection process that, unusually, 
emphasised non-price criteria (70% weighting) over price criteria (30% 
weighting). The tender was based on the conceptual brief and schematic 
design developed by the client and the consultants prior to the managing 
contractor’s engagement. Once the managing contractor was appointed, 
they took on the responsibility to manage the design documentation 
through the design consultants who were novated across to the managing 
contractor. During this stage, the government client maintained control over 
the design process. It was a requirement under the contract that client 
representatives approve all design changes nominated by the managing 
contractor, considering the original project brief, schematic design, 
program and cost plan. 
Once design was complete, the managing contractor managed the 
construction trade packages and provided ongoing management to the 
consultant’s production of construction documentation. The managing 
contractor held the majority of risks for design and construction cost 
overruns as they were not entitled to price adjustments under their design 
and documentation management fee, their construction fee or the 
nominated Guaranteed Construction Sum (GCS), which in combination 
comprised the Target Construction Sum (TCS) agreed during tender stage. 
Therefore, if actual costs exceeded the TCS amount, then it was the 
managing contractor’s responsibility to absorb these cost overruns. This 
procurement approach requires the managing contractor to have efficient 
cost management skills, as in most cases the contractor bids on partially 
completed documents to propose to the client a construction sum that will 
not be exceeded (Hampson et al., 2001). FIMs are suited to this 
procurement approach if there is potential to bring the actual construction 
costs in below the target construction costs (and then share savings).  
The financial incentive mechanism in the project was a 
performance-based FIM. It involved an incremental allocation from an 
incentive pool of $1.6 million built into the original project budget. The 
incentive offer was based on the completion of specific ‘stretched scope’ 
construction items outside the mandatory scope of the contract.  Overall, 
the FIM was intended to motivate the managing contractor, the consultants 
and subcontractors to achieve savings below the TCS and complete the 
stretched scope work items. Thus, if they saved money below the TCS and 
redistributed that money into the completion of the stretched scope, they 
received a share of the incentive pool. The incentive pool allocation was 
based around an exponential measurement equation. Therefore, the more 
stretched scope items completed, the larger the allocation percentage, up 
to a cap of $1.6 million for all items. It was intended that the FIM be 
distributed to the managing contractor, consultants and major 
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subcontractors, based on how much each contributed to achieving the 
stretched scope.  
Relationship management  
Common to the ‘Managing Contractor’ procurement approach, the 
project had extensive relationship management arrangements built into the 
project agreements. These arrangements encouraged the project 
participants to act as a single unified team, to foster relationships across 
organisational boundaries and to avoid adversarial behaviour. The 
relationship management process involved relationship workshops to 
develop team mission statements and introduce new team members to 
relationship management principles. There was a one day workshop prior 
to the commencement of site-work, involving the client, managing 
contractor and key consultants. Following this, there were monthly follow-
up reviews involving the same stakeholders to monitor relational quality 
and teamwork. The contracts dictated that all team members would act in 
good faith towards one another for the betterment of the project. The 
contract set out a clear dispute resolution process to prevent problem 
escalation. Relationship workshops and monthly relationship surveys were 
conducted to induct new team members and to assess the overall ‘health’ 
of the relationships via key performance indicators set out in the contract.  
The market conditions 
The managing contractor and their team of consultants and 
subcontractors experienced significant financial pressures during the 
construction stage. Market prices were rising sharply between the time that 
the GCS was agreed and the time the subcontractor pricing was agreed. 
The market rise was due a major increase in demand in the larger 
residential building market, which filtered across to the non-residential 
market in the major trades, particularly the key structural and finishing 
trades. This resulted in a major battle for the project parties, particularly the 
managing contractor, to complete the project within the TCS. To counteract 
these rising costs, the project team undertook comprehensive value 
engineering exercises, which resulted in approximately $5 million worth of 
construction savings with client approval.  
Due to the difficulty in completing the mandatory project scope 
within the TCS, it was perceived that it was unlikely that the team would 
complete any of the stretched scope work items, and therefore would not 
be eligible for any of the $1.6 million bonus pool.   
MOTIVATION DRIVERS  
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In this paper, the ‘motivation drivers’ are defined as the drivers that 
have impacted on the level of motivation towards the achievement of the 
FIM goals. The motivation drivers were identified and analysed using an 
inductive case study approach utilising constant comparative analysis 
across primary and secondary data sources. The fieldwork was based on a 
conceptual framework developed from a comprehensive review of 
psychological and economic motivation theory and financial incentives in 
construction projects. For further information on the research conceptual 
framework refer to Rose & Manley (2005).   
Although the FIM applied in the case project was deemed a failure 
by the client, there were aspects of the project conditions that were 
perceived to have a positive impact on motivation towards completion of 
the stretched scope incentive goals. Table 1.1 describes the positive 
motivation drivers identified from the interview data. 
Interview data indicate that the project workshops were effective in 
developing harmonious project relationships and in promoting motivation 
and commitment, despite the failure to achieve the FIM goals. According to 
the client, managing contractor and consultant representatives, the 
relationship workshops enhanced the project relationships, which in turn 
improved their ability to deal with financial pressures on the project and 
contributed to the successful achievement of the client’s mandatory time, 
cost and quality objectives. The managing contractor and consultant 
representatives also felt that the client representatives were willing to fairly 
approve cost saving design changes to alleviate some of the financial 
pressures on the managing contractor. 
Motivation was also intensified by future work opportunities. For 
the managing contractor, this instilled a sense of commitment to the 
project, particularly as the client undertakes repeat work in the industry, 
and generates a substantial proportion of the building work in the 
Australian state concerned. Further, the managing contractor has a history 
of working with the client, creating a strong and direct motivation to protect 
and extend future work opportunities through successful delivery of an 
iconic project. The managing contractor and consultant representatives 
were initially driven to complete the stretched scope goals, not only by the 
financial incentive reward on offer, but by the desire to maintain and 
improve their reputation with the Government.  
 
Table 1.1 Positive Motivation Drivers 
 






Initial relationship workshops assisted the formation of strong 
project relationships and established a ‘best for project’ team 
culture, driven by the relationship management requirements 
of the project agreements. 
Client Flexibility  Client representatives were willing to approve cost saving 
design changes to alleviate the financial pressures on the 
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The desire by stakeholders to improve their reputations, 
through successful delivery of an iconic project, increased the 
attractiveness of achieving greater than ‘business as usual’ 
performance. 
Value-driven Selection A value-driven tender selection process, with an unusually high 
(70%) weighting on non-price criteria, generated a desire by 
the project team to prove that the system worked and that the 




Under a team agreement, the financial incentive reward was 
on offer to all major project team members who had input to 
achieving the stretched scope work items, including 
subcontractors.  
 
Another positive motivation driver in the project was the value-
driven selection process that was measured on 70% non-price criteria. The 
client, managing contractor and consultant representatives perceived that 
the selection process positively promoted initial motivation towards the FIM 
goals. This was due to their perception that they had been fairly treated in 
the selection process, which they valued.  
In terms of the FIM design, the managing contractor and consultant 
representatives appreciated the client’s decision to allow the team to 
decide how the FIM would be distributed. This action encouraged the 
potential FIM recipients to perceive the system as fair. Although, the 
client’s approach to distribution was valued, the interviewees expressed 
that it was all in vain as the incentive goals were ultimately unattainable.  
Despite the existence of the five positive motivation drivers above, 
which focused stakeholder attention on the FIM goals, the managing 
contractor experienced significant financial pressures, which discouraged 
them from striving for the stretched scope FIM goals. Table 1.2 
summarises the overwhelming negative motivation drivers that influenced 
the failure of FIM in the project. 
 
Table 1.2 Negative Motivation Drivers 
 
Motivation Driver  
 
Motivation Driver Description 
Inequitable risk  
 
The risk profile of the Managing Contractor contract was 
perceived to be inequitable where the managing contractor 
took on the majority of construction cost risks under the 
Guaranteed Construction Sum (GCS). With rising market 
conditions outside of the project team’s control, risks of cost 




There was a very little negotiation allowed for in the contract 
over price between client and managing contractor to establish 
a fair and accurate Guaranteed Construction Sum based on 
market conditions.   
Late Engagement The managing contractor and subcontractors were appointed 
too late resulting in a failure to predict market movements and 
prevented their full input in the design process. 
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Single goal  
 
The failed single goal incentive (based on cost) did not reward 




The exponential curve system used as the performance 
measurement function was perceived as unfair under difficult 
financial conditions. 
 
It was perceived by the client, managing contractor, consultant and 
subcontractor representatives that the contract type discouraged 
motivation towards the achievement of the financial incentive goals under 
the market conditions. These interviewees believed it was unlikely that the 
market conditions could have been predicted, but if the construction risks 
had been equitably allocated under the contract in the first place, it would 
have improved their chances to achieve the stretched scope goals. Simply, 
under this contract, the managing contractor was unable to control 
construction costs, limiting the opportunity they had to invest money into 
achieving the stretched scope.  
The managing contractor and consultant representatives also felt 
that the managing contractor was under significant pressure from their 
client to negotiate and submit the GCS under an unrealistic time frame, in 
order to provide timely input to their project budgets, with a minimal 
negotiation process. This, in combination with the lateness in the managing 
contractor’s appointment during design development, (decreasing their 
ability to provide cost-saving design options because the building design 
was already well established) compounded the financial pressures on the 
project.  
As such, these cost pressures became so overwhelming that the 
stretched scope goals could not be completed, resulting in failure to 
achieve FIM reward. The managing contractor, consultant and 
subcontractor representatives also noted that the involvement of 
subcontractors in the design stage may have assisted the project team in 
identifying early cost saving design options and improve the accuracy of 
the GCS through negotiated subcontractor tendering.  
The managing contractor, consultant and subcontractor 
representatives felt that there should have been multiple goals set in the 
allocation of the $1.6 million incentive pool. They felt that the singular 
stretched scope incentive goal was too restrictive and in the end, they were 
not duly rewarded for other positive project outcomes such as schedule 
performance and value engineering efficiency.  
Another area of the FIM design that was perceived to have had a 
negative impact on motivation under the project conditions was the 
exponential measurement equation. Under the difficult financial conditions 
on the project, the managing contractor and consultant representatives felt 
that this was an unfair measurement system (also supported by one of the 
client representatives). They felt that the incentive amount on offer to 
achieve a proportion of the stretched scope work items was not enough, 
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based on the effort required to achieve it. This significantly impacted on 
their commitment to achieving the FIM goals.  
LESSONS LEARNT 
The management team, especially the managing contractor, 
experienced significant financial pressures due to a rising subcontractor 
market. It was unlikely that the project team could have predicted the 
extent of the increase, however these pressures could have been 
minimised though an improved GCS negotiation process, equitable risk 
allocation and earlier involvement of the managing contractor and 
subcontractors in the design stages.  It was generally agreed by the 
interviewees that the financial pressures, combined with perceived 
injustices in the FIM design and project conditions, decreased the 
effectiveness of the FIM. 
Analysis of the dynamics underpinning the motivation drivers 
discussed above indicates that clients could design more effective FIMs 
and associated contract conditions. Indeed, five recommendations for 
clients to improve FIM performance can be identified: 
 
1. The incentive participant should have control over their 
performance to achieve the FIM goals. In the project, the managing 
contractor, consultants and subcontractors felt they had very little control 
over their ability to achieve the FIM goals, which ultimately led to the failure 
of the FIM.  To effectively improve controllability of FIM performance in a 
rising market, it is recommended that construction risks are shared 
equitability between the client and contractor, and that flexibility is provided 
in the contract to handle unforeseen conditions.  
According to von Branconi & Loch (2003), ensuring that there is an 
equal balance of power and ‘room to manoeuvre’ in the allocation of risks 
between project parties will allow a joint response to unforeseen 
circumstances and prevent disputes and retaliatory action. However, they 
also argue that the appropriate allocation of risks in construction contracts 
cannot completely solve the issues associated with unforeseen project 
circumstances, which is where trust and informal relationship links fostered 
through cooperative behaviour can promote ‘win-win’ outcomes.  
Financial pressures on the case project were also compounded by 
inaccuracies in GCS estimates due to a lack of informed negotiation and 
late managing contractor and subcontractor engagements. It is best if an 
open book negotiation process occurs over the schematic design and 
design development stages to develop a fair and accurate GCS. The 
managing contractor should be appointed earlier than in the case project 
(usually at the beginning of schematic design) to improve buildability 
knowledge during design. This will allow the managing contractor and their 
consultant’s greater opportunity to manage construction cost risks. 
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The accuracy of the GCS can be further increased with the early 
appointment of subcontractors under a two-stage tender. Under this 
arrangement, the subcontractor provides input to design for a design fee 
and negotiates with the managing contractor on a fair trade package price. 
This can decrease the managing contractor’s risk of market movements in 
subcontractor prices. 
 
2. Incentive goals should cover all project performance areas, 
based on overall project priorities. The project performance goals and 
the FIM goals were misaligned. Although the project parties achieved good 
performance in the mandatory client goals, there was potential to improve 
this performance by increasing the scope of the FIM goals to incorporate 
other project performance priorities, harnessing the full power of the FIM. A 
wide range of performance goals (e.g. cost, schedule and quality goals) 
can assist in directing the incentive participants towards the right project 
performance areas, preventing single goal distortion, and maximising 
motivation through multiple reward opportunities. 
 
3. Incentive measurement process and reward distribution 
should to be perceived to be fair and equitable. The exponential 
measurement equation, as the performance measurement tool, was 
generally perceived to be unfair under the conditions experienced in the 
project. According to procedural justice theory principles, one way to 
promote fairness in performance assessment is to allow participants a 
‘voice’ in the process decisions, providing them improved control over the 
process (Greenburg, 2004). This can ensure that the FIM assessment 
process is perceived to be fair.  
It is also important that the incentive reward is fairly allocated to the 
contract parties who contributed to performance, particularly within groups 
with a high level of task interdependence and collectivism (Colquitt, 2004), 
such as in a building project. The distribution plan was devised by the 
project team which promoted a perception of equity in how the reward 
would be distributed if goals were achieved. If the distribution plan is 
perceived to be inequitable, it can have a negative effect on team 
performance resulting in individualistic behaviour.   
 
3. FIM goals and measurement processes should be flexible. 
In the project, it was initially perceived by the project team that the 
incentive goals were achievable. However, once it was realised this was 
unlikely because of overwhelming financial pressures outside of the project 
parties’ control, the motivation power of the FIM was lost. It was perceived 
by the managing contractor, consultants and subcontractors that if the FIM 
was adaptable to the changing project conditions, the motivational power of 
the FIM could have been redirected toward other relevant projects 
priorities. Kerr (1999) refers to this as ‘reversibility’ in an organisational 
management setting and emphasises that a reward system should be 
reversed if it is not achieving the desired effect.  
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5. Relationship management should be considered when 
designing a FIM strategy. Drivers associated with the relationship 
management process were identified as having a positive impact on 
motivation, including the promotion of the relationship through the 
relationship workshops, empathetic client representatives’ behaviour, 
emphasis on non-price criteria tender selection and the potential for future 
work with the government client. Although the ‘above business as usual’ 
FIM goals were not achieved, the project team did achieve their mandatory 
performance requirements and the managing contractor displayed a 
willingness to absorb significant financial losses to do so. This was 
generally attributed to the project relationship and the desire to maintain a 
good reputation. The identification of such drivers indicates that 
government clients should consider incorporating relationship management 
processes in future projects of similar nature in combination with carefully 
designed FIMs to promote ‘overall’ motivation and prevent calculative 
individualistic behaviour.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has focused on the application of a failed FIM as it was 
thought there would be useful lessons to be derived from an anatomy of 
failure, and indeed that seems to be the case. The paper has discussed 
the motivation drivers within the project context that influenced its failure. 
The findings challenge a general assumption in the industry that motivation 
is automatically assured if a FIM is present. In the case project, the FIM 
was applied with good intentions - to promote motivation through positive 
reward - however, due to perceived flaws in the FIM design and 
procurement approach, it resulted in failure.  
The results suggest that the motivation environment in an 
Australian Government large building project is complex and to gain the 
greatest motivational power from FIMs, they should be situated within a 
complementary range of interrelated systems that promote their positive 
nature, such as relational contracts with equitable risk sharing regimes. 
Without consideration of ‘supporting’ procurement initiatives, the FIM is 
likely to result in less than ideal outcomes. 
This paper has provided a basis for future exploration of the 
motivation drivers influencing the effectiveness of FIMs. Further research 
by the authors will involve investigation of the relative weightings of 
identified motivational drivers, to provide more focused guidance for advice 
to clients. It is also intended to design an experiment that tests which is 
more important to project outcomes – relationship management initiatives 
or FIM initiatives, as the research reported here indicates that the impact of 
investment in relationships may be greater than that of investment in 
financial rewards. 
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